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Conclusion: Governing the World? 
Sophie Harman and David Williams 
 
By posing a set of questions to each of the contributors to this book - what is being governed? 
What are the key mechanisms and actors involved in governing? And what are the issues and 
problems associated with governance? – the chapters have highlighted a array of actors, 
political processes, and domains that fall under the umbrella of global governance. This 
conclusion draws together the main findings of the book in response to these core questions. 
In so doing it does not provide a handy definition of global governance; as the Introduction 
outlined this is not the aim of the book and in many ways can be a fruitless endeavour as one 
key aspect of the concept is its elasticity and nebulous nature. Instead the chapter draws 
together the central findings of the chapters to highlight common themes, practices and issues 
that help further our understanding of global governance 
 
What is governed and why? 
 
Almost all aspects of everyday life around the world are now subject to some form of global 
governance or regulation. Whether regulation by a regional body such as the European Union, 
a form of international law such as the international health regulations, or subject to convention 
or norms such as the responsibility to protect. Even if these institutions, laws, norms or ideas 
are ignored those that breach them are held to account through their existence. Hence in 
response to the question of what is regulated and why it is clear that most aspects of everyday 
life are now subject to some form of global governance, the degree to which depends on the 
issue and where you live.  
One way of thinking about the proliferation of regimes of governance has been to focus on the 
management, supply and regulation of global public goods such as the environment and water. 
Public goods are generally understood to be those good which are non-excludable and non-
rivalrous in consumption; in other words everyone can access them and in so doing one’s access 
should not prevent another person from accessing the same good. The regulation of such goods 
is seen to require global governance because of their global nature. Though some of these 
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goods can be sourced from different parts of the world, as the politics of water provision attests, 
there are questions over which public actors such as states or private actors such as water 
companies can lay claim to owning such goods. Hence there is a need for co-ordination and 
attempts at management between public and private actors that all have a stake in the provision 
of such goods at a global level. One problem arises when public goods become private goods. 
Certain public goods and how they are provided for are becoming increasingly private goods, 
in that they do exclude people and are rivalrous in consumption. This is evident in the global 
governance of the patents on pharmaceutical products, an issue that cuts through both the public 
good of health and the private good of trade where the cost of such treatment makes the public 
good of health both excludable and rivalrous in consumption. What is to be governed thus 
includes those goods that are public, increasingly those that are private, and those that are 
somewhere in between.  
The most difficult question to unravel when thinking about global governance is why a specific 
issue is seen to require governing in the first place. Part of the difficulty of this is it points to 
how specific issues are understood by the varied actors involved, and the degree to which they 
are willing to act towards addressing these issues. This can be a collective problem of 
governments attempting to generate public will in support of measures requiring co-ordinated 
action and behaviour change from various aspects of society. For example on an issue such as 
corruption this may require changes to government accountability and transparency 
mechanisms, oversight and regulation of business practice, and individual perceptions and 
tolerance. This can be an individual problem of how people perceive threats to their own lives 
and lifestyles and whether such a threat requires action or governance of some kind. This can 
be a problem of competing (at times expert) opinion of what actually necessitates a threat to an 
individual’s human rights or a state’s security for example, and thus requires the generation of 
a particular consensus in support of one opinion. The problem of identifying what is governed 
and why is thus inherently an area of political contestation where competing claims to what 
should be prioritised and the nature and legitimacy of such claims are questioned or accepted 
by the individuals, states, public bodies and private agencies involved in the governance of the 
issue.  
The degree to which governance resembles an area of political contestation depends on the 
issue. For many case studies in this volume, politics is often something implicit to the process 
of governing but rarely acknowledged in practice. What is governed and why is often seen as 
functional and in many cases reactionary rather than preventative. Governance arrangements 
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have often sprung up or been reinvigorated in response to the need or emergent necessity to 
regulate a specific issue, whether financial crisis or increased trade liberalisation. The 
underlying assumption is that specific issues such as labour for example both should be and 
can be governed globally. Moreover such governance necessitates a combination of public 
actors such as government bodies and expertise drawn from the private sector such as financial 
regulators or the public sector such as university researchers to draw together effective ways 
of managing issues. Thus the focus is on management and solution-orientated practice. What 
becomes tricky is the politics of what constitutes the right solutions or the most effective means 
of management that is not only linked to what is to be governed but who is the best position to 
do the governing. 
 
Who does the governing? 
 
A common feature of governance reports, recommendations and progress measurements are 
collective words such as ‘we’ and ‘our’ (‘Our Common Neighbourhood’) that deliberately 
position global problems and their governance as something that affects us all. The majority of 
who does the governing in practice, however, comes down to a broad range of states, civil 
society organisations, private companies and authorities, knowledge leaders, 
intergovernmental organisations, and partnerships. And the relationship between these and 
some common ‘we’ is a central theme in debates about global governance – do they really 
represent ‘our’ interests and concerns? How can ‘we’ shape what these collective agents do? 
It is clear from this collection of case studies that the state is still very much a central part of 
global governance. States remain the signatories to key forms of international law, are held to 
account for shortcomings or a lack of will to address problems, and are seen as key sites of 
legitimacy for global commitments. However the influence of the state in global governance is 
also dependent on the issue and the state. In some instances individual leaders or political 
parties tend to be criticised for their role in governing specific issues whether George W. Bush 
in rendition and the environment or Tony Blair in security rather than the state itself. In other 
cases it is the governments or states as a whole that are the contentious actors, for example in 
the case of Australian refugee policy outlined in Orchard’s chapter it is not individual members 
of the government or a political party but Australia as a whole that takes this stance on migrants. 
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With cases such as the governance of finance the state is seen to have a role but its ability to 
exert such a role is constrained by market forces and the role of private actors such as credit 
rating agencies.  How states operate in global governance also depends on two distinct factors: 
i) whether the issue serves their domestic political interests and foreign policy agenda, and ii) 
whether they are able to exert such an interest in the wider institutions and partnerships of 
global governance.  
 
Global governance is sometimes seen as the process of the global north governing 
arrangements in the global south. This case can be argued when looking at how aid money is 
given to govern global poverty through goal-setting and reform of country systems and political 
and social structures or how the global trade agenda seems to disadvantage farmers in the 
predominantly global south. However this binary does not apply to all issues of contemporary 
global governance. As case studies such as that of extraordinary rendition shows, governance 
mechanisms are also used to hold states in the global north to account for their actions. Such a 
north/south divide also overlooks the blurriness of processes of global governance and the 
agency of actors involved in it. While in some aspects a north-south distinction is clear, in 
others a more east-west distinction can be made, and in some cases such a distinction does not 
exist or is in a process of change. 
 
One of the most common arenas for states and non-state actors to exert influence is in 
intergovernmental organisations, usually falling somewhere under the umbrella of the United 
Nations. Each of the chapters herein has highlighted at least one UN agency as the cornerstone 
of global governance. What is clear from the chapters is that the ability of UN agencies to 
promote co-operation or provide solutions to collective security problems is often wanting. UN 
directives in the form of guidelines, resolutions, or in-country operations all serve to establish 
a general framework of governance for multiple issues. However, the degree to which these 
frameworks are integrated into domestic contexts, seen as legitimate, or adhered to remains 
questionable. In some issues such as security, the UN remains hampered by the dominance of 
the permanent five members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, 
and United States of America). In other areas such as climate change the UN is limited by 
divisions between country concerns in the north and south and with regard to issues such as 
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health the institution is overcrowded by other bilateral and multilateral agencies with bigger 
budgets and greater expertise.  
 
A common finding across the chapters has been the lack of influence and presence UN agencies 
have in comparison to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and private 
agencies. International financial institutions play a key role in the process of governing in 
perhaps obvious areas such as labour, corruption, and trade as well as roles in less obvious 
areas such as health and the environment. This has been a growing phenomenon of the last 
thirty years and has been an intrinsic part of the growth of market-based principles in the 
process of governing. The growth of economism is evident in the application of market-based 
principles of goal-orientated strategies and targets in areas such as governing poverty, markets 
and trading schemes for pollution reduction, the focus on economic growth over labour 
standards, and the stated benefits of free trade with minimal public sector intervention or 
barriers. These principles are not only applied to how problems of governance are understood 
and addressed, but are also relevant to the type of actors that are seen to be required to 
implement the process. For some, market principles are best implemented by those who know 
how markets work, i.e. the private sector, rather than those who want to limit or regulate 
markets for a variety of reasons, but most commonly taxation, i.e. the state (depending of 
course on the type of state). In other areas the private sector seeks to create governance 
arrangements as a means of self-regulation to prevent the emergence of state regulation. Hence 
governance when linked to markets requires a degree of private sector participation.  
 
Public-private partnerships are not necessarily a new phenomenon in governance, and have 
arguably been a key part of the modern world since the beginnings of empire and the industrial 
revolution. What is pertinent about partnerships today is their ubiquity across multiple areas of 
governance. Partnerships are seen as a key way in which to widen participation in governance 
and bring in expertise, dialogue and crucially money from the private sector into public forums 
of governance. In the main such partnerships are a one way street, the bringing of the private 
sector into the public sector rather than the other way around. The private sector is subject to 
public regulation and the private sector does consult aspects of the public sector, however 
partnership of bringing the public into the private is seen as a rarity or, at the extreme, an 
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example of corrupt practice. Either way these publicly-based partnerships are central actors in 
global governance whether in the provision of security, health, or labour standards. 
 
The prominence of state-led and market-based approaches to multiple areas of governance 
often means that civil society organisations are overlooked. The term ‘civil society 
organisations’ can refer to a broad range of highly professionalized international non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational advocacy groups, community groups, 
activists, and faith based organisations. Many of the chapters highlight the role that these 
organizations have played in bringing key issues to the global agenda. They boost collaboration 
and provide channels of advocacy for those seen to be detached from the decision-making 
forums of global governance and are often important interlocutors between the international 
and local by their members and donor partners. These actors are not only involved in the 
framing and profile-raising of particular issues, but are also intrinsic to the implementation of 
global projects and agendas and form the basis of service delivery and partnerships in-country. 
They are contentious for the campaigns they promote and their claims to representation and 
legitimacy, yet they fill a gap by making global governance more transparent and more 
accountable to people, at least to some degree. 
 
The final key actor with regard to who does the governing is that of experts or knowledge 
sources. Networks of of experts cluster around all of the issues examined in this book, and they 
have become key opinion formers and influential contributors to how states, civil society 
organisations, business and intergovernmental organisations think about global problems and 
how to address them. The complexities of specific issues in global governance and the demands 
on the time of employees of various institutions has given rise to an expert network of 
consultants that offer advice and knowledge on a range of issues from how to harness social 
media, to how to break the trade deadlock in Doha, to how to best eradicate malaria. These 
networks stress the technocratic aspect of global governance in providing scientific or 
knowledge-based responses to global problems. The growth of such actors into a culture of 
consultancy in global governance has to an extent shifted the focus of governance away from 
the political to the technocratic.  
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In the regimes of governance examined in this book there are, then, a complex set of agents 
involved, relating in often-complex ways. These relationships are sometimes co-operative, but 
at other times antagonistic, and it is through this that the politics of global governance becomes 
visible. Different agents often have different interests, commitments and sources of legitimacy, 
and have different abilities to influence the construction and development of regimes of 
governance. This is one reason why global governance is often such a messy, contentious and 
ultimately open-ended process. 
 
What are the main mechanisms of governance? 
 
Governance operates through a range of mechanisms. Binding or non-binding forms of 
international law have provided the main framework for the practice of global governance 
across the chapters. This is evident when looking at the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. The central purpose of such international law is protection, guidance, 
adherence, and standard setting for all actors involved in global governance. Legitimacy for 
such legal frameworks is derived from the number of signatories a specific law may have, what 
the law regulates and the origin of the law. There are extensive debates about the status and 
significance of international law, however as these chapters have shown its very existence, as 
vague as some aspects may be, provides a benchmark for governance and the behaviour of 
states and other actors. International law with regard to global governance traditionally focuses 
on sources of public law, however the increasingly privatised nature of governance, and 
problems of trade and finance, see an increased blurring of public and private international law. 
One form of soft international law or soft regulation is voluntary standards and codes of 
conduct. Labour standards, financial regulation, or corruption monitoring are all examples of 
voluntary conduct established by partnerships between the private and public sector as means 
of self-regulation and standard-setting. Such standards are often established at the global level 
through initiatives such as the Global Compact and the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) but impact on national behaviour through their adoption at state level. 
The purpose of such standards is regulation, crucially either in partnership with the state or 
somehow separate from the state. Standardisation is perhaps one of the less recognised 
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mechanisms of global governance but perhaps the most all pervasive when considering the 
informal behaviour and codes of conduct private companies do or do not adhere to, how they 
become the basis for domestic law, and how they impact on everyday life of people around the 
world, the products we buy and how we work. 
 
One way in which international law shapes the conduct of states is through the creation and 
codification of norms. Norms of behaviour, conduct and governance also emerge from 
entrepreneurs (whether states, individuals, civil society organisations, private businesses) and 
through processes of repetition, practice and consolidation can become entrenched within 
domestic and international systems as operating principles of governance. Norms can take on 
different forms and expressions and can be generated by a range of actors. Civil society 
organisations for example have been particularly influential in the creation of key human rights 
norms. The extent to which norms actually operate to constrain actors varies from issue to 
issue, and like almost everything else involved in global governance, are subject to contestation 
and interpretation.  
 
Ideas and knowledge or claims to knowledge are another key mechanism of global governance. 
As Death’s chapter highlights, competing rationalities or ideas about the problems of the 
planetary environment lead to very different outcomes or justifications for action and inaction. 
Ideas or claims to knowledge can be used as a source of ‘evidence’ in which to generate 
political will or engender fear or the need to act on specific issues. Knowledge can thus be used 
as a mechanism of governance in two main ways. First it can be used to frame an issue in a 
specific manner so as to elicit wider support or suppress the collective need for action. Claims 
to expertise can here refute widespread political opinion with the assertion that somehow the 
‘facts’ or ‘evidence’ is incorrect and thus the need for governance is wrong, misunderstood, or 
somehow different to what was first thought. The second use of knowledge can be in 
establishing and maintaining a dominant paradigm of how we think about the world and 
solutions to specific problems. A common factor in many of the chapters has been the liberal 
manner in which problems ranging from migration to labour to trade have been framed and 
responded to. This liberal approach to governance issues is supported by knowledge claims 
about effective policies that promote good governance or market-based reform and to an extent 
narrows the scope for alternative paradigms or claims to knowledge. Thus as a mechanism of 
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governance, specific kinds of knowledge are intrinsic to how issues are understood, approached 
and governed; and when adopted at the global level can be applied in ways that squeeze the 
space for alternative means of thinking about problems. 
 
A central mechanism associated with the role of norms and knowledge in global governance is 
that of issue-framing. Incidents of framing issues as security threats, human rights concerns, 
emergencies or crises can be seen throughout the chapters. The purpose of such framing is to 
get attention for an issue, galvanise political and monetary support, and precipitate action on a 
competing international stage. Issue framing that targets key international civil servants, 
political leaders, and public opinion that generates associated campaigns and leverage can 
elevate specific issues to areas of high importance in global governance. As Kamradt-Scott’s 
chapter shows this has been a key source of getting financial support for global health 
strategies, particularly HIV/AIDS. However such framing can also lead to threat or crisis 
fatigue that has the opposite effect of reducing an issue’s pertinence in global governance.  
 
Issue framing, voluntary standards and norms are limited as mechanisms of global governance 
without transnational political campaigns to support them. The sources of such campaigns can 
be from civil society, key states, the private sector, intergovernmental organisations, or the 
combination of all four. Campaigns elevate particular ideas or issues and galvanise widespread 
political support for their governance. Moreover campaigns are intrinsic to adherence to 
international law with regard to the public ability to name and shame key actors that fall out of 
commonly accepted standards. Such naming and shaming can have little immediate effect in 
some instances, as Blakeley and Raphael’s case study on human rights and rendition suggests, 
but can have a longer implicit effect on the reputation of a state, person or company. Global 
campaigns elevate issues of concern, police breaks from key standards or norms, and can act 
as markers of progress.  
Measurement, goal-setting and performance have increasingly become mechanisms of global 
governance used by intergovernmental organisations, states and civil society organisations to 
measure progress in response to issues. This is most evident in the case of the Millennium 
Development Goals used in the governance of poverty as Hulme and Scott’s chapter discussed. 
Measurement and goal-setting suggest global governance is a project that can be measured and 
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monitored. In this sense global governance could be interpreted as something that has an end 
project or goal or specific aims. The content of such aims, however, remains precarious and 
hard to identify. As with the section on what is to be governed, this can depend on the issue, 
the actors involved, and the ideas popular or dominant at the time. Hence global governance is 
not a static entity but a process that is always in flux. Attempts to control, regulate and monitor 
progress of the project of global governance thus lead to several shortcomings and difficulties 
in the practice of global governance and how we can understand it. 
 
Governing the World? The practice and problems of Global Governance 
 
What is clear from the enclosed chapters is that while regimes governance exist to regulate 
global issues and promote greater co-operation between varied agents, there are several 
tensions and problems within the current forms of global governance. On the one hand the 
process of governing issues can be seen to be working; there are multiple different 
configurations of actors, processes and ideas established to respond to both contemporary and 
traditional issues. This shows the existence of political will, support and commitment to at least 
some form of global management. However the type of will, support and commitment often 
remains limited and, and there are significant problems with how global issues and processes 
are identified and understood. Some issues, such as labour and poverty for example, are seen 
as inherently feminised problems; yet gendered frames for understanding them or addressing 
them are not forthcoming. Some ideas or concerns about security threats supersede wider 
concerns of human rights and protection of migrants. Some regulation and standardisation in 
areas such as trade have an adverse impact on aspects of health. Hence the case studies included 
in this book show that no aspect of governance operates in isolation of wider processes of 
global governance thus leading to tensions over what should be governed and what forms or 
issues of global governance take priority and why. 
 
Competition for political attention in global governance can in part stem from a lack of 
leadership. In many of the case studies leadership mainly comes from dominant states, the odd 
civil society campaign, or in some instances the private sector. What is lacking is leadership in 
intergovernmental organisations. The result of which is the culmination of many state and non-
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state actors operating at multiple levels of governance with only directives, statements and 
rhetoric to guide them. Directives, agreements and goals are all set but there is little leadership 
in seeing them through. Problems of leadership and commitment to some of the regulatory 
frameworks of global governance have in some instances led to the generation of new 
institutions, partnerships and frameworks for action. Some of these new actors and processes 
have been successful in generating money to support an issue and providing new ideas, 
however in other areas they have added to an overcrowded space in which governance is 
defined by many different acronyms rather than activity or function.  
 
Different understandings, rationalities or paradigms in which various issues of global 
governance are understood can generate inertia and lack of progress. This is evident in aspects 
of governing climate change, poverty and human rights. What to prioritise and how to do so 
can generate competing approaches to an issue that can counteract each other and undermine 
co-ordination. Global events and state priorities can skew agendas towards self-interest or 
alignment with other areas or efforts. However this is not just the action of states; 
intergovernmental organisations can also align issues and mechanisms of governance with their 
own interests or that which they think will gain greater traction in the international system. 
Thus the merits or normative arguments for why specific issues become politically relevant or 
important in the international system are often second to or intertwined with domestic interests 
or the money available to implement processes of governance. 
 
Money and structures of capital overwhelmingly frame the space and options processes of 
governance operate in. Nesvetailova and Belli’s chapter on governing finance shows how 
governance structures failed to address or foresee the 2007 financial crisis, and have since 
failed to establish some form of regulation or control of capital and money around the world. 
Langan’s chapter on trade shows how the wealth of rich countries and the lack of wealth in 
developing countries limit progress in consolidating a global system of liberalised trade. 
Capital is increasingly subject to voluntary standards and private forms of regulation and 
international law. However public regulation and global public regulation is seen as somehow 
wanting. This is in part because of a lack of political will and part a lack of ability. The lack of 
such will and perceptions of an unregulated system of finance however is changing in aspect 
of public opinion, particularly within Europe. This may, in turn, generate wider debates on how 
 284 
money can or should be regulated globally within existing and new models of governance; or, 
it may see a shift of European ideas and control of mechanisms of governance decline.  
 
These problems suggest that global governance is somehow not working as well as it might, 
and that governing issues is and always will be somewhat problematic. However, this only 
holds if governance or governing is seen as a static entity that is not capable of evolution of 
change. Moreover, it also suggests that governance is somehow separate from and not a space 
for politics – namely contestation, discussion, and debates over what the best course of action 
is, who is best to lead it, and what mechanisms are available to do so from the broad spectrum 
of options available. Global governance is messy, vague and only vaguely cohesive, as it 
involves a myriad of ideas, people, and social forces. What the problems inherent to the practice 
of global governance really suggest is that governing is not just about the process of managing 
a broad array of actors and ideas; it is also an area of political contestation and negotiation. 
Hence the problems of global governance are in part directly attributable to the process, 
mechanisms and actors involved, but also reflect the core dynamics of the politics of 
international relations. Global governance is thus in many ways the technocratic, multi-
participant way in which international relations is operationalized in practice. It is thus not 
separate to or somehow different from the tensions of say diplomacy and foreign policy, but is 
an intrinsic and vital part of how we understand the management of international relations.  
